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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF OF APPELUEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant defends the trial court's ruling in favor of Defendant by dismissing the charge 
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, based on two (2) prior convictions 
of the same charges, and based on records from two (2) justice courts, both which are "courts of 
no record"., and enhanced to a third degree felony by the use of the two prior convictions in the 
"courts of no record". 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The trial court couched the issue of compliance with Rule 9-301(2)(B) and the lack of said 
compliance. 
Defendant argues that issue presented to the trial court is whether the records from the 
justice court can be the basis of a third degree felony when, in fact the records are from the 
justice courts, which are by definition "courts of no record" 
CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Defendant relies on the "due process" clause of the United States Constitution and the 
"due process" clause of the Constitution of Utah, and that the use of such "records" are 
violations of the "due process" clause when "records" come from a "court of no record", 
Defendant is charged under Utah Code Ann 41-6-44 with a third degree felony based on 
two (2) prior convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol in two (2) justice courts. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, enhanced to a third 
degree felony ;pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 (2003) and based on two (2) prior 
convictions within ten (10) years of this conviction 
One of Defendant's friends interpreted for him at the in his initial appearance, but 
retained counsel shortly thereafter. 
The State's witness, the officer, testified that the blood alcohol was .17. 
The State submitted records that Defendant had been convicted twice before, within ten 
(10) years 
Defendant moved to dismiss the enhanced charges based on the fact that the prior 
convictions were decided injustice courts, which are by definition "courts of no record".,. 
The language of the Statute does not permit the use of prior convictions to be applied 
retroactive, and that the : "courts of no recorcTare indeed are "courts of no record." 
The trial court dismissed the arguments and and instead sua sponnte held raised the issue 
that Rule 9-301 had not been complied with, and on those grounds found in favor of Defendant. 
Defendant was surprised with the ruling by the trial court and his reliance on Rule 9-30L 
and did not anticipate said ruling. 
The trial court issued a ruling dismissing the enhanced charge, without prejudice, and 
permitting the prosecution to "file a lesser offense..." The Drosecution declined and this anneal 
was filed by the State. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATITTF 
The Legislature amended the DUI statute effective July 1, 2001, and reads as follows: 
UQA 41-6-44 (6)(a) 
A conviction for a violation of Subsection is a third degree felony 
if it is committed 
(i) within 10 years of two or more previous convictions under this section, 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of 
(A) Automobile homicide, 
(B) a felony under this section committed after July 1,2001. 
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The State argued in the trial court that" There is nothing ambiguous about the statute." 
Defendant argues that, to the contrary, that the statute is not crystal clear. The inclusion 
of the automobile homicide clause does nothing more than muddy the waters. For some reason, 
the legislature found it necessary to do so, and the question arises as to why the statute is so 
constructed. Surely the legislature would not deliberately pass an ambiguous statute, or would 
they, and if so, for what purpose. 
The DUI statute appears to have been crafted so as to be ambiguous. The structure of 
the statute is odd, at best, and nefarious at best. 
For what reasons are the DUI statute and the automobile homicide statute combined in 
this DUI statute? And why is the configerationof the statute somewhat odd.? Is the reason to 
allow the courts to interpret the law in favor of the State? 
A look back at the previous DUI statute in 1996 is telling. The 1996 DUI Code follows: 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 (1996) 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation under committed within six 
prior years or two or more prior convictions is a (1) class A misdemeanor, except 
as provided in this Subsection and 
(ii) a thud degree felony if at least 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23,1990, or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1,1996 
The comparison between the 1996 DUI statute and the 2001 DUI statutes is 
remarkable. The 1996 DUI statute is clear, straight forward, easily understood, and has and 
effective dates of April, 1990 and 1996. 
The 2001 DUI statute is ambiguous, and construction of the 2001 DUI statute leaves 
open the door open for retroactive application for 10 years.. 
In fact, the 2001 Statute is, in fact is being applied retroactively, in spite of the plain 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 68-3-3. which reads as follows: 
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
In practice, the State and the Justice Courts are applying the 2001 DUI statute ten (10) 
years back from the present offense, and have been doing so since the 2001 DUI became 
effective. 
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DUE PROCESS AND THE DUI STATUTE 
The basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduce that 
makes it a crime has been recognized by the Supreme Court. 
The case of United States v. Harris. 347 U.S. 612. set forth the "defmitiveness" 
standard as follows: 
The constitutional requirement of definitiveness is violated by 
a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. 
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally 
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand 
to be proscribed, id at 617 
We have recognized in cases that "a statute that either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application, violates the first essential of due process of law. 
A comparison of the 1996 DUI statute and the 2001 statute reveals the attempt by the 
legislature to "muddy the water", i.e. to leave open the door to various and sundry interpret ions 
of the DUI statute, including the resurrection of old DUI convictions for the purpose of using 
prior convictions for DUI and enhancing the charge to a third degree felony, 
The 2001 DUI statute certainly leaves open the very essence of a statute which can be 
and has been interpreted to fulfill the results the legislature was attempting to achieve. 
However, in order to enhance the charges in DUI cases, the legislature must rely on 
vagueness of the statute to accomplish the objective of .enhancing the charge to a third degree 
felony. 
A comparison of the DUI statute which came into play in 1996 and the present DUI 
statute shows the amazing differences between the two (2) statutes. A further look at every 
DUI statute back to 1990 shows that the 2001 statute is an aberration, and not in keeping with 
the straight forward language of the DUI statutes in Utah 
A perusal of previous statutes does not include an enhancement of a previous conviction, 
or convictions to a higher charge. There appears to be no such enhancement precedent in Utah. 
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PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURAL LAW 
COURT OF NO RECORD 
Procedure is the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished 
from the law which gives or defines the right and which by means of the proceeding, the court is 
to administer;: the machinery ,as distinguished from the product. BlacFs Law Dictionary. 4th 
JEditipn,
 11957r 
The Utah Legislature, in all of it's collective wisdom, or lack thereof, "repealed" the 
Circuit Court in 1996. 
In doing so, the legislature violated long held procedures which define the rights of a 
defendant, and by which the means of the proceeding the court is to administer., 
At the same time, the legislature abandoned the "justice of the peace" a "court of no 
record ", and created the "Justice Court", also a "court of no record" 
The legislature then imposed duties on the "Justice Court" , including trials for driving 
under the influence of alcohol, and related offenses, which would previously adjudicated by the 
Circuit Court "on the record". 
The scenario continues, and the legislature added provisions so that a prior DUI can be 
"enhanced" to require that a second DUI now has a longer jail term of 10 days in jail, and fines 
and fees totaling as much as $1800 plus. 
It is in this posture that the legislature then came up with the notion that a third DUI can 
be charged and convicted for a third DUI, and the result would become a conviction for a third 
degree felony, with a sentence of from zero to five (5) years in prison. 
The present full text of UCA 41-4-44. the DUI statute is attached at Addendum (1) 
The 1986 DUI statute is instructive. 
UCA 77-35-7 (c) reads as follows: 
(c) if a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on to plead before 
the magistrate. During the initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised 
of his right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary 
examination, and the prosecutor consents, the magistrate shall forthwith order the defendant 
bound over to the district court. 
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THE MISSING MAGISTRATE 
In the quest to overhaul the justice system in Utah, the legislature "repealed" the Circuit 
Court and distributed the functions to the justice of the peace, now known as the Justice Court. 
The Justice Court, however, remains a "court of no record". 
A first offense for DUI carries a penalty of two (2) days in jail and fine of $1200 plus. 
The legislature also provided that the Justice Court records can be used to "enhance" a 
second DUI conviction with jail time of (10) days in jail.and fines and fees of $1800 plus. 
The charge of a third DUI degree felony bears a sentence of from zero (0) to five (5) 
years in prison. 
The repeal of the Circuit Court is the repeal of the magistrate, and the attempt to assign 
the duties of the magistrate to the Justice Court, formerly known as the justice of the peace, and 
with the same status as a "court of no record". 
In spite of the designation of the justice of the peace now being re-named the "justice 
court," the Justice Court is still retained as a "court of no record.". 
And the "records" of the justice court are now used as a basis to enhance the penalties in 
the justice court, and ultimately turned into a third degree felony. 
A comparison of the functions of the now repealed Circuit Court, aka the magistrate, is 
instructive. 
TJCA 78-4-2 (1990) reads as follows: 
The purpose of this act is to create a statewide court of record of limited jurisdiction 
to provide full time professional judicial service to every county in the state on a regular 
basis organized and administrated in like manner to the district courts of the state. To 
this end, this act shall liberally applied, 
UCA 78-4-4 (1990^ Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII Sec 1 of the Constitution 
of Utah circuit courts are established to serve the people of Utah with the State being 
divided into circuits as provided in this ehapter 
For well over 100 years, Utah citizens have been served by the full time professional 
judicial service to every county in the state on a regular basis, including the time when the 
Circuit Court, literally rode from one court to another. 
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The Supreme Court of the United State has on numerous occasions expressed the need for 
a magistrate, particularly in the context of search warrants. 
Katz v. United States 389 U.S 347 held: 
Noting that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places. We concluded 
that every electronic ease dropping upon private conversations is a search or seizure 
it can comply with constitutional standards only when authorized by a neutral 
magistrate upon a strop of probable cause and under precise limitations and 
appropriate safeguards. 
Upon a search of the issue, Defendant has not been able to locate any reference which 
would allow a justice of the peace to act as a magistrate. 
STREAMLINE JUSTICE 
Several months prior to July 1,1996, District Court Judge Lyle Anderson convened a 
meeting of the Southeastern Utah Association. The purpose of the meeting was to explain to the 
members the changes in in the laws made by the previous legislature.. 
Judge Lyle Anderson advised that the legislature had repealed the Circuit Court, and the 
changes would "streamline" the judicial process by eliminating the Circuit Court, aka the 
magistrate. 
The new idea was to give original jurdistdiction in all matters civil and criminal, to the 
District Court, not excepted by the Utah Constitution. The District Court was to take 
jurisdiction over all matters filed in the Circuit Court ijJed prior to July 1, J 996. 
The "justice of the peace" title was abandoned, and" justice court" was born. The 
"justice judge" was invented. The new "justice court" conducts"trials"but "not on the record." . 
At the same time, the "records" from the previous DUI convictions in the justice court 
are the basis for a third degree felony charge, if the prior convictions occurred retroactively 
within the last ten (10) years. 
Prior to 1996, the Circuit Court presided over preliminary hearings, and held 
misdemeanor trials on the record. With the demise of the magistrate, misdemeanors are the 
purview of the justice court 
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The State wants to have it both ways, i.e. the revenue from the fines and fees, with no 
accountability or oversight for the what kind of justice happens in the "court of no record", 
i i iv I V U I C v i i^ttvv w i n n u i oiafiu. i v i o u v n a p i v p x j o i l i u n . 
r r i - . - . i i . ! « . — . . . _ J — . . j * , 1 - / ^ . . . . , : . . . . .. r . i . • : . ' " i . ? •« - . * 
not stand for such an outcome i'he iiiith ^* i« i *e\ ai • 
The 14th Amendment reads in part: 
No State shall make or enforce law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
ixv/1 oiicXit tiii. y u i u t v u v p i i v v m i y u v i o v n v/i m y , n u v i u . \JI p i v / p v u V . 
without due process of law 
nor denv any person vuthm a^ lunsdictiontne equa; proles • • * • .. *". 
-o puip '^w. v»; jjn^prb.K'iK.i s: UK - \ - O V- . i o determine P^ trulh .e need to 
ex.«» " •» ' <he c o n s e q u e n c e ^ ' ^ f **•'• " • ' f - t ' ^ * M » « < " • *»'>•••»*••' . 
incentive to "streamline" Justice? 
I ItoVi K o c Ho/-1 m c t i P A C n - p f h o r\f*ar>e> i n TT+oVi -fXr mr*Tv» f n o r j *:» h n n H r A / ^ T/Aorc ir» f k ^ "I S A f P o w t u n iicvvj l i u u J U O U V V J v/i l i i v L /WUVV i n u i w i i v i i i i v / i v t i iu . i l u. i t u i i u i v u Vv^w.ii3. x i i (.JLXV I U U U o 
u i ig i i a i i i l u u i i g L^aiieu On lViuiiiKMi mC u i a n u p d az> juduv^cs u i u ic p ^ a u c 1 n^ii j u u waa IU ivCcp 
the peace.". The penalties were light and no records were kept. The Justice of the Peace was a 
lay person and kepi no records*, hencejhe designation COUJI oi no ,ea>rd/' 
rtiiihu. :., magistrate, some other ennh had m come in to replace the "functions and 
-iv justu* court unshorn Someone had lo luauik tin miso- mcaiiwts, and VM justice court was 
the recipient v •, longer does I he msfice oHhe pence msf bundle justice of the peace offenses, 
hut are now elevated to a "justice court iudae" , with all of the trimmings i.e. a black robe 
class "B" misdemeanors, and a pay raise very nearly the same as a district court judge. 
The question remains: why did (he criminal justice system in Utah have be"streamlined"? 
The answer again appears to be one of "follow ihe money ".Eliminating the magisirale allowed the 
justice of the peace to become a trial com • ^ im a >a\ judge raking in the spoils lor the new 
building for the ji 1 \ 'enile detention facih^ ' I!*:*JV •• f \! VCP&P lew fire trucks, 
tool 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND THE STATUTE 
Constitution of Utah. Sec. 7. No person shall be deprived ol Me. liberty or property 
without due process of law, 
Constitution of"the unites States. IHID ,,r,|iQL ftor shah miy Mate ucpme any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law... 
THE 2001 DITI SJ «'| I ! HE 
UCA 41-6-44(6)1 a) reads as follows: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is committed 
(i) within 10 years of two*n nmit r , • « • . - ^ - > 
n any time aiter a conviction of 
(A) Automobile homicide .. that is committed after July 15 2001. 
(B) a feiony violation under this section, that is committed after July 1, 2001 
J 'J k V L ' T D I 1/ " l ' I S l \ l 4 PLl'I'l 1 f"U 1 I I'lfe'Ii." I ' l l , 1 ' • ' ! • • / L I" 4 ""I*! 1"1"I? 
This Statute defines itself when read and applied prospectively. 
Section (6¥a3 nrovides tWt "a ^^nviction fbr ;l ^ i< *tai i* M*I (vf ^nHcp* :1 ii n i < ' ) i i« a t h i r d 
degree felony if it is committed : ' • * within ten years of two or more prior conviction. 
Section f c /i „ K n ?u\) pro\ ;aes the same charge o• A .>. iu active leionv lor' :tiJlairioI\»k' 
homicide mat ^ oomnuned ?uter .*ui\ .!<».H 
states! a leiony vioiauon unuei uio section ma* is committed alter Jul)' lr lilu 1 
q 
The positioning of each part of the Statute appears to be vague, at least, and 
uv-'iiL/wiatX/, a i v v u i a i , i v a v n i g , u w i u i t u a i i i a,i i..\ IL J i 13 v \ H I 1 tawi v v u n u c u 1.1.5, Vvi ty 1 \ amipii,/ it" 
arranging the ^arts of the statute could have and should have been crystal clear. We ask why. 
Il Ini'1-, Sliilulr llltris Ihuv I * I Sections, 
The first section provides that a conviction for a D u i violation committed within ten i S 0) 
\ w i l l 1 • : » ; U l ' ."'- '* - P ' ' • * " * ; - . . . . . . . . ; . . . - , , . . . . . , . . . , . . , . . r - . M v i - . j f j l l t 1. : i f « ' - ! * >1 ' -
committed after a certain date 
flie second section ( A ]i the automobile homicide section , does include the langi lage "that 
is committed alter juiv i. 2w i , i he automobile homicide portion of the statute is coinpiete, in 
1 r* . . i i 1 J *1_ 1 . _ _ . . , „ _ . . CCj.;!,,, j. 2 .,,. „ . _ ; j U . , ,J __Q . T. .1- .. 1 ^ A A P ? 
; i i r i u i r s i i i r , s - u u - '-;i . -., Uiilv'^ HiC S i l l l ^ u a i i C . 111&1 15 U U l M l U IICU i l l IC1 J U i y J..., ZAJU 1 . 
TV ip t h i r r i c p p t i A n /T^ \ H A P C n o t oru=*f»if ir»al]v H^f-mp* o p n i Y i p T n p t n i r r l Q P r t m n ^ "F^ c i rnr>1\r 
A H V Cii ixV*. J V V U V i j l \JL~r ) V*V/VL> AAV/V [ J U V V l i l V U l i V U V 1 H 1 V W. V l l l l i V / . X ,I..l\y U l l i U D W U V I I V X - ' / SxXXXlJxj 
states; "a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1 2001", 
Standing alone, the third section has no meaninc. ~Hu stamu simplv savs "a felony 
violation under this section that is committed after h\h 1. ?«»ii" Tius> portion of ihe Staiuie 
must refer to another part of the statute in order to be relevant. 
The automobile homicide portion of the statute is complete in defining the crime and 
providing for the effective date, i.e. Ji ill;; 1, 2( )( )1I 
The only section to which the third section can refer is the DUI section, which prov ides 
u n a i a \.A„M.i V Ii i n ;i i, i\ n a v n nau\ rn i JM I )u i b ^ v ^ m ti i \ : ; .i.;:> a t i i i I U \ i\ 5,1 V/U JA l O n y .1 1 11 i s v. \ u 1.1 1 1 1 » Li. u 
within ten (10) years of two (2) or more prior convictions under this section" 
"I 'he language in this statute is also dispositih s c i the issi le of prioi \ iolations : 3 
convictions. The statute states: " (B) a felony violation under this seen on that is commute J afiri 
i hi statute does not address the use of prior violation- or convictions which occurred 
prior to July 1, 2001, The lack of any reference to prior convictions in the statute can not be 
interpreted as to allo*\ ox condone the use of prior violations or convictions to enhance any 
violation or com - :••-.•-. subsequent to July I '<>ni. 
A M I jtJlAfJti.A r..ivi t. i 1 /rrjCirqpiu Ami* *\ i w r i \ i if£ i,Y?J .hJEiLAn* I '* 
The tenants of the Court of no Record are the lay judge and petty offenses. 
How can the State enhance a prior conviction from the justice court to a felony charge in 
this case, a DUI, that the alleged " records" are bv definition "Courts of no Record"? 
Is charge of driving under the influence of alcohol is ...»longer a ''pettv often-, 
A lay judge cannot possibly posses the legal euncatn*" or iraminv t<> annK the aw s of 
Evidence, the Rules ui v_ ninn.a1, nocedure, including the burden ol prouL pus M a^i anc niie 
jurisdiction, and precedents set forth in applicable case law. 
The fact that a lay judge is a person wuo has demonstrated mauiiM} v? JLLU .^'? 
integrity and the ability to apply the appropriate with impartiality" is not capable of issuing a 
legal pronouncement of gum wmjii van be enhanced u> a icsonv 
COURT OF NO RECORD 
r
 I "!,. / * iiie v^onsiiiution oi Ulan ^HM.^O in AIL v ILL ouc. i 1 ioi , uuges oi cour Is not 01 
record". The judges are selected for a term, with qualifications provided bv statute \ ^wever, nc 
qualification may be imposed which requires judges of court; \M wv * xoic IJ ^ ddst: ,,: o 
practice law. The number of courts of record shall be provided bv statute. 
' " X 78-5-137 (4) delineates the qualifications of a justice court judge: 
i \ • ustice court j udge shal 1 be a person w ho has demonstrated ma ti inty ot ) udgnient, 
integrity, and the ability to understand and apply appropriate law with impartiality. 
the Justice Court, and includes, being a citizen of the United States, 25 years of age, a resident of 
voter of the county of residence.. 
1 1"I \A, 7;R S II' 14 nrni/irlp*;:, tli^t flip i net i r e rnijrt havp iurisHipfinri nvpr rrlnQQ R anrl C*. 
misdemeanors, violations of ordinances, and infractions within their territorial jurisdiction, except 
those offenses o\ ei w hich the ji ivei tile con u t has exclusn e ji irisdiction. 
UCA 78-5-12 i rcquue^ HUH d HIKKCI in- kept. 
UCA 7o-5-j 22* <'•'';••; v • *hv !n>!iL L -,'uui: to iiave a docket index, to be Kept in aipnauetical 
order, and include tne names o±. tiie parties to eacn judgment. 
UCA 78-5-122 orovides that entries in a Justice court judge's docket under Sec. 78-5-121, 
certified by the judge or his successor in office are prima facie evidence of the facts stated. 
Records from the justice court are reported to the Bureau of Criminal Identification and to 
NCIC, the national register. Records are available to employers, insurance companies, and others 
who may have need to know a particular person's criminal history. 
The"recii-.' -^  n^-d UK-H io enhance the penalties on a subsequent conv iction, 
The use of the words "Court of no record" in the Utah Constitution and in specific 
statutes, as IIOKU a^n t . is HOI a simpie 'misnomer". 
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The State cannot have it both ways. If the State does indeed believe it is in the interest of 
4 1 1 i"\ n . ' i j n \L;-i, J *4 '* +'l-'i.-i i C in si.+"£ t, -f J l"n -«: 3"<;.:i * i ( ", / in "i-t-l" .1 \\ "t-"i / 1 I ) .c%« n v*-. I +1 \ J »i ,o * I "in 1 11+ I ) m 114 f 1 1, i:::n. V f n l a ,1 »i-v«it \ ,( \.4~ 4 \i (-ha 
t,j ii,v u t ' U L / i v \ ; i 1,11.li 1 >tciiv i\ t 1 l a w a * v iti n i o i ix » J ^  v \ % *i\ i ,, u t\ J i ^ > t *\ 11 J M u , 1 .1 iv 1 n emu \jitt 1 1 n M en 1 1 i.u 
same time claim thev are iustified in the use the "records" from the Court of No Record to 
ei il iat ice+v" * ^p*\ai+ c^ • vf »,<
 >ei im , C1 r! ] i e, ::)| C1 jt t j 3S? rl ((| r j s c a s e a c.| iai: ge 0f ( j | |\ mg} u ) ( j e i $ ie 
influence or aioMioi 
*~\ . r . . - 1 . . • ' . . ' J i!. ' . " ; . * . ' %. ' * - **T r* . ? 1 \ * r *, -4 „ . 
* " ! r > v, »(? ' *• 1 if i ' : * • - ! ! : 1,11 1 t *t ^1^31- * s i i i i w i 1: 1 ; , : t i i : i • \ i 1 - \ * 1 * i " L I v J l L L i i i l 
does argue that if the State is going to have a Court of no Record, then the justice court records 
must be prohibited for \ ise for any and all other" purposes, including enhancements to a greater 
crime, and notifying BCI, NCiC, employers, insurance companies, ui others. Anything less is 
deceiving, and a a mockery of of the Rule of Law. 
THE LAI J I) DGE 
To be chosen as a justice court, a person must be a citizen of the United States, 
25 years of age, a resick n; *.". i (<•: :*•< least three years, a resident of the county, and a 
qualified voter. UCA 75-5-136 
justice court judges are appointed by the appointing authority anu coiiinmed by a 
majority vote of the local legislative body. UCA 75-5-134(2) 
A justice court judge employed by one entity may not receive a total salary greater than 
85% of the salary of a district iud-e UCA 78-5-128(1 Va) 
A justice court iudiie cmnloved in fMi.ir ihati one entitv as a Justice court iud^e mav not 
receive a total salary greater than the salary of a district court judge. UCA 75-5-128(1 Va). 
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In 1972 the Supreme Court decided Ward v. Village of Monroeville. 409 U.S. 510 (1927). 
the judge in the justice court was also the mayor and the village received a substantial portion of 
its income from fines imposed by him as a judge. The issue was the possible bias of the judge 
ai id that fear may materialized fn this case. 
In a similar case, Tumev v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510. the issue was not the training or 
education of the judge, but at uu j- le to interest in the outco a ^ 
The Tumey Court field that the financial interest in the fines was thought to \i^ <\ 
possible bias in finding guilt and fixing amounts of fines by t; ^  j uU^ »; ^ . fummcy Court found 
that the potential for bias was not impermissable. 
rl 'he fact that a lay judge w f to has no more than A !u^;. .Ui<.»- npioma iv being paid the 
same salary as a district court. judge certainly leaves the distinct impression that the decisions of 
the justice court are suscepumc \o mas leaning m l.noi : . . mpio^u,» ,: mc iocdi w u'es, 
towns,and municipal entities. Whose side is the Justice Court Judge on? The answer is unclear 
or disc or taken by a court stenographer. No verbatim,, transcript is not available to determine 
what a defendant was told or not told and could have understood. 
There ur no "oversight" of the |u«;tuv court Thi justice comt can commit crroi aftei 
error over and over again, without even knowing it because there is no record. 
r • • . ' . J 
by who. In some justice courts in this jurisdiction, the judge prohibits taping the proceedings. 
1 A 
- I t — 
The same errors can continue to occur ad infinitum because there is no way to "prove"' 
procedures, 
cards" 1 he foundation of this "house ot cards" rests on proceedings that began in both instances 
bUCIi iiici^OiluUC tiitit vvv/Uiu t t i ivi n i v \JUIK/\JIII\S x)l m v vaov , 
To suggest that (lie Jeinedv is lu-'<iv v . lij.u.i- >-; • .-, .-•, j;.iv.U!:icni pu^>niu -.- o 
nlocn h !•- of tr< rights is not a substitute to having the cou:' condu*: an appropriate Rule 1 1 
c i. 
I UC J US HOC ^ O U l l J U U g C IS UlClfcUC 111 UlC l a w U1IIV LU UlC CXlCl l l U l U1C 11*111111 l g U l U l 3 U 
t i:U : , v\i, .. , ,vr::tVnn\ '(1CA 78-5-127(2Ma) 
The difference between a high school graduate and a jtid^e who has earned a Juris 
**•• • ' i degree *s moi e than night and daj * . . '*. - •* i^ ,;- - - \e.ir\ *>f undorrrndi..,* 
es. three (3) years of iaw school, and successmi. passage the three (3) day bar examination. 
An ippiK-1-"!' i<»--" -t'sM-iM J-ih-.i i.^ 11Pun:::-if.; i(itiii)ugii uacKgrouiiu screening 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 
The United States Supreme r o n r i m 1888 in wrote Callan \ Wilson. 127 U.S. 540 
Except in that class or grade of offenses called petty offenses, winch according to 
^mon law, may be procc 
/>/%•« c+t+n+oH TAr +no+ nnrfHACo 
v u n j i i i u i v u l v l cimi jJui pvov . 
1 h e J u s t i c e Ol t h e i 'CaCc IICLS IXCiHitc t i le J U > I I L ; 
"imo  i .   r eeded against summarily in any tribunal legally 
-}5-
The United States Supreme Court described the justice court system in the case Colton v. 
Kentucky. 407 US 104 in the following manner 
the interior are not designated or equipped to conduct error-free trials, or 
insure or full recognition of constitutional freedoms. They are courts of 
convenience, to provide speedy and inexpensive means of disposition 
of charges of minor offenses" 
In the case ofNurth v. Ru^ell. 427 U.S. (1977) the Supreme Court addressed the 
justifications of the state for continuing justice court tribunals, including "increasing burdens on 
state judiciaries", and the "interest of both the defendant and the State to provide speedier and 
less costly adjudications" than those provided in courts where the full range of constitutional 
guarantees is available. 
The State could designate driving under the influence charges as Class A misdemeanors, 
and trials could be heard on the record before a qualified, law-trained judge. In that setting, there 
would be no question about the prior proceedings, and the penalties could be enhanced on a 
second or third conviction. 
The Russell Court addressed the State's policy of "convenience" to those charged to be 
tried in their own community, rather than having to travel to a distant court where a law-trained 
judge is provided, and to have a trial after business hours. The Court noted these practical 
considerations. 
The questions regarding the "convenience" of having a trial in their "own community" 
and not having to go to a distant court have been answered, at least in this State. 
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The 1996 transition from a justice of the peace" to a "justice court judge" and the fact 
that the justice court is now7 a trial court has refigured the legal landscape. 
The result is that almost every small town, municipality, or city now has its own justice 
court, together with jury trials, its own judge, its own staff, and its own police department. 
The cities and towns have found a lucrative money making machine. Emery County has 
only two (2) justice courts, but other counties have numerous justice courts. Carbon County has 
five (5) justice courts, and Sanpete County has nine (9) 
Another consequence of the "morfmg" of the justice of the peace into a trial court is the 
hiring of substantially more police officers. For instance, Helper City in Carbon County, a town 
of 2000 people, in 1963, had one chief of police and one part time deputy. Helper City now has 
eight (8) police officers. The trend in other similar small towns it the same. 
SHQVLD A DM A BE PETTY QFFENgE? 
The premise of justice court is the lay judge, the Court of No Record and the "petty 
offense". 
Defendant submits that based on the fact that this Statute is on the books and now before 
this Court is the best evidence that the charge against Defendant of Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol is no longer a petty offense. Perhaps the Legislature should take another look about 
DUTs and so re-classify the DUI as a Class A misdemeanor that can be enhanced to a felony. 
Defendant does not argue that the justice court per se should be abolished. 
Defendant does argue that to base a third degree felony charge on the "records'5 from the 
"Court of no Record " is simply not true, by definition. 
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There is no "record" m the justice court. The piles of paper the justice court is ordered to 
keep and/or present to a defendant does not overcome the basic fact that there are no reliable 
records from which the whole truth can be known There is no system in place to listen to the 
actual proceedings. There is also the lack of accountability in at the actual proceedings. 
The proceedings in the justice courts are not based on the Laws of Evidence or the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
The rulings of a justice court judge are not made based on the Rule of Law, but on the best 
judgment of a person "who has demonstrated maturity of judgment, integrity, and the ability to 
understand and apply appropriate law with impartiality". UCA 75-5-137(4) 
UCA 41-6-44 , the Driving under the Influence of Alcohol, 
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this Court for an Order reducing the charge in this case 
from a third degree felonv to a Class B Misdemeanor DIJT charge and remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings. 
DATED THIS W y^j^ /26<&\ 
MARGRET SIDWELL TA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with 
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — 
Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties - Suspension or revocation of 
license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and 
(10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is taken illegally in the 
body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related 
reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which judgment of conviction is 
reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any district, possession, 
or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, 
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse program that is 
approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 
62A-15-105; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and dependency screening and 
assessment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates 
a substantial risk of death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program that is 
approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 
62A-15-105; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a 
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to 
a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle 
in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if the 
person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with 
Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the 
court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order substance 
abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance abuse 
treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the person in 
accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of. 16 or higher, the 
court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior conviction under this 
section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 
consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with 
Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the 
court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order substance 
abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance abuse 
treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate, 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or more prior 
convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of conviction is reduced under 
Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a prison sentence and 
places the defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring the person to obtain a 
screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse treatment program 
providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after 
treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court orders probation, the 
probation shall be supervised probation which may include requiring the person to participate in home 
confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be suspended and 
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed under this 
section has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a 
convicted person to: participate in a screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse treatment; or 
do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44,6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and assessment, an educational series, 
or substance abuse treatment in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection with 
applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), 
and (6). 
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(i) complete all court ordered: 
(A) screening and assessment; 
(B) educational series; 
(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs. Upon receiving the 
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notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 
53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in 
satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution 
shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the 
violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was consumption of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this Subsection 
(9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or 
41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the first time under 
Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense under 
Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is 
committed within a period often years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number 
of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the 
previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may order the operator's 
license of a person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an 
additional period of 90 days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the court 
shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's 
driving privileges for a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate corrections, probation 
monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person, so that the person's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place an 
electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence 
of the person or other specified location. 
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(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance abuse testing 
instrument, 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time the person is subject to 
home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend school educational 
classes, or employment and to travel directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person is determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be administered directly by the 
appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under 
Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation, 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation, and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by contract with a probation 
monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor the person's compliance 
with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and court orders received under 
this article and shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence or those 
conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation if the person is 
determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the 
court under Subsection (14)(d)(0-
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence that 
the person had a blood alcohol level of. 16 or higher, then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then the court shall enter the 
reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation for the person in 
accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with 
Subsection (13). 
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